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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALVIN C. SPACKMAN, 
R-esponden·t, 
'VS. 
ALTON J. CARSON, 
Appella1~t 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this action the plaintiff-respondent sued to re-
cover damages claimed to have been suffered in a motor 
vehicle accident as the result of defendant's alleged 
negligent operation of his truck. Defendant's answer 
denied any negligence on his part, and alleged contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in failing 
to keep a lookout for defendant. (R. 5-6.) The defendant 
appeals from a judgment on the jury's verdict for plain-
tiff. 
The only question presented by this. appeal is 
whether the court below erred in denying defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict which was made on the 
grounds that there was no evidence of defendant's negli-
gence and that the evidence showed without dispute that 
defendant was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law in the particulars alleged ( R. 290). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The ac.cident happened on 25 October, 1947, at about 
3 :45 p. m. on U. S. Highway No. 91 at a point about 1.2 
miles south of the City of Richmond. The road there 
runs in a straight line approximately in a north and 
south direction for at least a mile past the defendant's 
home, which is located just east of the highway opposite 
the point of the accident. The weather was clear, the 
sun was shining, and plaintiff had an unobstructed view 
of the .highway for at least one-half mile as he ap-
proached f"rom the south on his motorcycle. (See Record 
1, 5, 85, 86, and 146). 
It is undisputed that immediately preceding the 
accident the defendant's truck and automobile were 
parked in front of his home, headed north on the east 
side of, and from four to nine feet from, the paved 
and traveled portion of the highway. The truck was 
about 18 inches behind the passenger car. (R. 88-9, 147, 
200-203, and Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, R. 237.) 
The only witness of the actual collision were plain-
tiff and defendant. 
The plaintiff testified that he was driving his 
motorcycle north on the right hand side of the highway. 
When he first saw the truck it was parked in the position 
described. At that time he was ''some distance'' south 
of the truck (R. '88, 96). He estimated the distanc.e as 
"-about 200 feet. That is about, not exact." (R. 146.) 
Mter he came around the turn about a half-mile south 
there was nothing between him and the truck to obstruct 
his view (R. 146). 
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.The plaintiff ne:rt san' the truck ~ohen he was about 
30 feet from the point of the accideHt. At that time, 
according to his testimony, the truck had moved out 
onto the east portion of the high,Yay, 'vith the left front 
w·heel about 11h feet east of the centerline and the rear 
end of the truck still slightly off the pavement. He did 
not see it at any time bet~veen the time of his first view 
of the parked vehicle and the time when it wa,s on the 
road immediately in front of him and moving about 10 
miles per hour, according to his estimate. (R. 89, 91, 96, 
154 and 163). It was then too late to avoid a collision. 
The uncontradicted testimony of the defendant is 
well illustrated by Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, which 
was admitted for that purpose. He testified that his 
purpose was to haul some old cans to the river. His 
intended course lay directly north on U. S. 91 for about 
a large city block· and then west. He had parked the 
truck behind his passenger car only ten or fifteen 
minutes before, and had loaded the cans. He came 
from the house, walked in front of his truck, between 
it and the car, and then back (south) along the truck 
to the cab. There was then nothing on the highway south 
of him. He entered the cab, started the motor, and 
backed up 12 or 15 feet to get space to clear the car. 
He applied his brakes to stop. This lighted his red 
stop-light on the left rear of the car. He then looked 
in the rear view mirror. There was nothing· in sight. 
Thereupon he shifted into first gear (the truck has four 
speeds forward), made an arm signal and drove slowly 
northward almost parallel with the highway but grad-
ually angling out to the left onto the east portion of the 
pavement. He shifted into second gear. His two left 
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wheels were on the pavement, the left front wheel about 
two feet from the centerline. Both right wheels were still 
off the pavement. The defendant then saw a red flash 
in the rear view mirror, followed by a red flash beside 
him. There was a crash and the noise of the motor-
cycle engine roaring. The defendant's truck made a 
sharp turn to the right, and traveled twelve feet to a 
point off the highway, where defendant brought it to a 
stop. Defendant got out. The plaintiff was beside the 
road, and the motorcycle, with engine running wild, was 
in the west half of the road. He examined the plaintiff, 
decided he was too badly injured to be~ moved by him, 
shut off the engine and summoned aid. (R. 210-222). 
There is no contradiction of any of this evidence, 
with the minor exception that the plaintiff indicated 
that defendant's truck was at a sharper angle to the 
line of the highway when plaintiff saw it the second time 
in the moment just before the impact. This is probably 
immaterial, but we doub~ that any reasonable mind could 
believe, in the light of the physical evidence, that plain-
tiff had received a correct impression of this point. The 
nature of the damage to the running board (Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 2) and the front axle (Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 3) of the truck clearly shows that the force of the 
blow which bent them came from the rear toward the 
front, instead of from the side. Moreover, it is uncon-
tradicted that in the collision the left rear clearance re-
flector and the front running or ''courtesy'' light on the 
left of the truck, were stripped off, and the tie-hooks 
underneath the left of the truck body were bent for-
ward. ( R. 223). 
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The fact remains that plaintiff, who could have 
seen (f he ha-d lookt:d, did not see the truck back up, 
did not see its stop lights illuminated, did not see it 
stop, and did not see it move forw·ard and to the left 
onto the high,Yny, although he knew the truck was there. 
As he did not look at the truck he did not and could not 
attempt to controvert the defendant's testimony, and 
there is no eYidence in the record, anywhere, that the 
defendant ""'as negligent in any of the particulars alleged 
in the complaint. The plaintiff merely testified, in ef-
fect, that he saw the truck parked, and when he looked 
again it 'vas in front of him o:p. the highway. 
When both parties had rested the defendant moved 
the court for a directed verdict for defendant of ''no 
cause for action'' upon the grounds that there was no 
evidence of negligence by defendant and that the evidence 
showed without conflict that plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence in failing to keep a reasonable and 
prudent lookout for other vehicles. The court, by Judge 
1\rlorrison, who presided, denied the motion (R. 290) and 
submitted the case to the jury, which brought in a ver-
dict for plaintiff, and judgment was entered thereon. 
Defendant duly and regularly gave notice and moved 
for a new trial, assigning insufficien-cy of the evidence 
to support the verdict. Upon denial of this motion this 
appeal was taken. 
STATEMENT OF ERROR 
Appellant relies upon the following error committed 
by the trial court for a reversal of the judgment of the 
court below : 
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1. The trial court erred in denying defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict in favor of defendant upon 
the issues on plaintiff's complaint: "No Cause for 
Action.'' 
ARGUMENT 
As we view this case, only two points need be dis-
cussed: 
F·i,rst: There is no evidence that the defendant was 
negligent. 
Second: The evidence shows without dispute, and 
on plaintiff's own testimony, that the proximate cause 
of the accident was the negligence of the defendant in 
failing to keep a lookout for defendant's truck and to 
act properly in accord with the knowledge this would 
have brought him. 
I. There is no evidence that defendant was negli-
gent. 
Little need be said on this point. It is self evident 
upon an inspection of the record. Defendant's truck 
was parked on the untraveled portion of the highway, 
where it had a right to be. Plaintiff saw it there as he 
approached from the south. The next time he saw it 
it was partly on the east ha1f of the highway, as it had 
a right to be. 
The only evidence as to how the truck proceeded 
from the first to the second position is that of the de-
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fendant, and it shows that he proceeded cautiously and 
carefully in all respects. The plaintiff admitted that 
he didn't see the maneuver--he didn't see the truck at 
all bet,,·een the first and second positions. The alle-
gation of the complaint that defendant drove suddenly 
and without any signal into plaintiff's path when plain-
tiff was only thirty ( 30) feet distant is absolutely un-
supported. On the contrary, when plaintiff looked up 
\vhen thirty (30) feet a'vay the truck was already in 
the east lane of the highway, according to plaintiff's 
own testimony. 
The testimony of the plaintiff fails to show any 
negligence, while that of the defendant, showing the 
exercise of reasonable care, stands uncontradicted. It 
is obvious that plaintiff was ''woolgathering'' while the 
defendant was carefully driving his truck out onto the 
highway. 
We submit that the motion for a directed verdict 
s~ould have been granted on this ground. 
II. The evidence shows 'Without dispute, and on plain-
tiff's own testi1nony, that the negligence of plaintiff w·as 
a proximate cause of the accident. 
It is apparent from all the circumstances in this 
case, as well as from the plaintiff's own sworn testimony, 
that the plaintiff just did not look at what was happen-
ing on the highway immediately in front of him, or that 
if he did look it was so inattentively that he failed to 
perceive the developing situation w_hich so obviously 
and so vi tally affected his own safety. 
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The def en dan t 's truck did not ' 'rna terialize'' out of 
nothing, like the ectoplasm of the spiritualists, in the 
pathway of plaintiff's motorcycle. It backed up twelve 
or fifteen feet, turned on its stop light, turned off the 
light, and drove diagonally forward onto the road, all 
in plain sight of the plaintiff on a bright, clear day. 
The plaintiff had already seen the truck: he knew it was 
there before him on the highway, and that he was ap-
proaching it at a speed of about forty-five miles per 
hour. And yet he swore he did not see any of these 
movements: he did not see the truck at all between the 
time of his first view of the parked vehicle and the time 
he saw it right in front of him on the highway. (R. 154) 
He did not slow down, he did not sound a horn, he did 
not give way to the left. In fact the plaintiff did nothing 
to indicate that he had seen that he was riding into dan-
ger. Clearly, he told the truth: he did not even see the 
obvious movements of the truck, fraught with signifi-
cance as they were. Where he was looking it does not 
appear, but the ineseapable conslusion is that he was 
not looking before him on the highway down which he 
was riding at forty-five miles per hour. If he had 
looked he would have seen the truck's movements; if he 
had seen the truck's movements he would have taken 
some action to avoid a collision . He would have sounded 
his horn, slowed down, or turned to pass on the left of 
the truck, where on his own story there \vas ample 
room. 
The simple question here is whether the plaintiff 
was, as a matter of la,v, contributorily negligent in fail-
ing to keep even the casual look-out before him which 
would have disclosed the movement of the truck into his 
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path in ample time to aYoid a collision. W f:\ submit the 
proper an~\Yer is in the affirmative. 
In fart this court has, we submit, already decided 
this question of la"'" in the 'Yay we suggest by its opinion 
in the recent case of 
Conklin YS. Walsh 
193 Pac. 2nd 437 (Utah, 1948). 
The facts of that case and the one at bar are 
strikingly similar. In that case this Court held that a 
driver of a vehicle on an arterial highway was contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law where, while 200 feet 
back, he observed a vehicle approaching on his left and 
then failed to observe the approaching vehicle again until 
it was too late to avoid the collision. The fact that the 
approaching vehicle had to stop for a stop sign was 
deemed insufficient to excuse the failure of the driver 
of the vehicle on the arterial highway to keep a proper 
lookout. In Conklin v. Walsh the approaching vehicle 
was visible to the favored driver for a distance of be-
tween 63 and 77 feet. In the instant case the defend-
ant's truck was visible for a half mile and admittedly at 
least two hundred feet. Both the approaching vehicle 
in Conklin v. Walsh and the defendant's truck in the 
instant case were in motion while in plain view of the 
other vehicle. In both cases, the driver on the arterial 
highway saw the other vehicle while back about two 
hundred feet from the point of impact and in both 
cases the driver- on the arterial highway failed to look 
again at the other vehicle until too late to avoid the col-
lision. In the case of Conklin v. Walsh the driver .on 
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the arterial high,vay attempted to excuse his failure to 
look on two grounds (a) he was protected by the stop 
sign and (b) he was looking at traffic that might be 
coming from the south. Both of these excuses V\7ere 
deemed insufficient by this Court. In the instant case 
no excuse was given by the plaintiff as to why he traveled 
170 feet after seeing the defendant's truck right in 
front of him without making any further observation of 
the truck and its movements until it 'vas too late to 
avoid the impact. Furthermore, in the instant case the 
truck was right in front of the plaintiff while in the 
Conklin v. Walsh case the approaching vehicle was 
coming from the left and was not as easily observed as 
defendant's truck. We feel that if anything the instant 
case is even stronger on its facts than Conklin v. Walsh, 
and that the trial court erred in failing to rule as a 
matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence which would bar his recovery. 
The case of 
Mingus v. Olsson, 
201 Pac. 2nd 495 (Utah, 1949) 
is also in point. There this court held that a pedestrian 
who proceeded onto a crosswalk, where he had the right 
of way, wa.s, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory 
negligence in failing to look for and see an approaching 
automobile. As the court there said, 
''The duty to look has inherent in it the 
duty to see what is there to he seen, and to pay 
heed to it. " 
In the case at bar it is clear that the plaintiff had a 
10 
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duty to look, in \\?hich "·as inherent the duty to see the 
defendant's truck as it backed and then moved forward, 
and the further duty to pay heed by taking appropriate 
and easily available action to ""'arn defendant and to 
avoid a collision. He discharged none of these duties, 
but drove blindly on until the truck loomed up before 
him only thirty feet a\Yay. The failure to discharge 
these duties is contributory negligence as a rna tter of 
law. 
See also Hickok Y. Skinner 
190 Pac. 2nd 514 (Utah, 1948). 
It seems clear that u~der a correct application of 
the law to the uncontroverted facts in this case the de-
fendant-appellant was not guilty of_ any negligence, but 
even if he were, the plaintiff-respondent was himself 
guilty of contributory negligence, barring recovery, as a 
matter of l:ttw. 
The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict. The judgment of the. court be-
low should be reversed and the court instructed to enter 
judgment for defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BULLEN & BELL, 
THATCHER & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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